“Second Place Failure”

Hmmm…gonna have to think about that one for a bit….

BUT! More importantly….Have you registered for the 2007 MilBlogs Conference yet? You snooze, you lose! Pony up your $40 now, before the first 100 slots are gone!….

Trackbacked @: Third World County

It’s not been pretty, reading editorials from CPU Magazine and Maximum PC regarding the operating system new to the market….

One of the editorialists happen to be the man who brought us DirectX as a Microsoft employee. Credibility in my book.

Long story short: It drags down your hardware (therefore, get ready to do major upgrades), it assumes there is much piracy and takes a very “conservative” look for DRM (digital rights management)….and now, I find out when visiting Bad Vista that it seems many mainstream programs will require an upgrade (read…more $$$ out of your pocket). Also, it seems Vista isn’t doing well with many games.

Seems to me the “complete re-writing” of the OS has left the run of the mill MS user in quite a quandary…stick with XP (better buy a copy if you’re planning on building a new system, MS doesn’t make it anymore), or dump a lot of cash for the OS upgrade (BTW, XP Pro will not upgrade to Vista Home Premium), then more into more memory (512M is the absolute bottom amount you can have, with 4GB (can you say “$350+, Thank you Mister Gates!”) being the “sweet spot”), and then….possibly have to buy upgrades to business programs.

Toss into the punch bowl a friend of mine recently hired his first employee and bought a system for the new guy and figured he’d just get two to establish a baseline. They came with Vista and he couldn’t use his Canon printers. Canon techs told him they can’t get drivers to work, so either buy new printers, or drop back to XP. He also had some problems with QuickBooks Pro 2005 not being able to run. Net result of this first person report: Scrubbed the drives and installed XP.

Bad Vista looks like a place to keep up with the latest gouge and get a few giggles for you Mac guys, too….

I’m sure the business world isn’t gonna be happy….

Trackbacked @: Third World County

Distributed computing has become a valuable tool in analyzing masses of data. One of the first was the SETI@Home project (about 2.7M years of computing time has been used on this effort), which needed help searching through the volumes of collected radio spectrum data pulled down. Since that project modeled a method to use other computers across a large area network to assist in culling through the info, there are now protein folding project at Stanford University. Here’s what they say the work is for:

Our goal: to understand protein folding, misfolding, and related diseases

What is protein folding and how is folding linked to disease? Proteins are biology’s workhorses — its “nanomachines.” Before proteins can carry out these important functions, they assemble themselves, or “fold.” The process of protein folding, while critical and fundamental to virtually all of biology, in many ways remains a mystery.

Moreover, when proteins do not fold correctly (i.e. “misfold”), there can be serious consequences, including many well known diseases, such as Alzheimer’s, Mad Cow (BSE), CJD, ALS, Huntington’s, Parkinson’s disease, and many Cancers and cancer-related syndromes.

You can help by simply running a piece of software. Folding@Home is a distributed computing project — people from through out the world download and run software to band together to make one of the largest supercomputers in the world. Every computer makes the project closer to our goals.

Folding@Home uses novel computational methods coupled to distributed computing, to simulate problems thousands to millions of times more challenging than previously achieved.

From the “Results” page, what the project has accomplished already:

2005 First results from Folding@Home cancer project published. We have been studying the p53 tumor surpressor and our first results on p53 have recently been published. You can find a summary and link to the paper on our papers page.

If you’re a biology geek, or have an interest in Intelligent Design, there is some really interesting information about proteins at the Stanford site on using anoantubes and the information for help design drugs absed on this research.

Who’s playing? Lookee here!

Just an recommendation to use some of that electricity wisely while you’re not actively using the CPU cycles for your direct use…

Tracked back @: Third World County

This post stuck to the top for a while….newer posts will follow until I remove the “stick.”
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They say it clearly. We can’t grasp it as a country, much less as the Western World. Scary, telling, insightful, yet some have known this all along. Bolding in the quoted article below is mine for emphasis. Read and be educated.

Iraq: Jihadist Perspectives on a U.S. Withdrawal

By Fred Burton
www.stratfor.com

Last week, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a nonbinding resolution to express disapproval of the president’s plan to send more troops to Iraq. Republicans in the Senate prevented a similar resolution from coming to the floor for a vote the next day. The congressional actions come during a period of vigorous debate about U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan — a debate that is being heavily fueled as presidential hopefuls from both parties begin to position themselves for the 2008 election.

Naturally, this internal debate and media coverage have focused on the American perspective — and, more specifically, on public opinion polls. But often missing in that discussion is the fact that Afghanistan and Iraq were not entered into as self-contained discrete wars, but as fronts in the wider U.S.-jihadist war. Therefore, though the Bush administration’s troop strategy, the positioning of the Democrats and the anti-war statements of potential presidential contenders are by no measure unimportant, the intense focus on these issues means that another important perspective on the war — that of the jihadists — frequently goes unmentioned.

Al Qaeda leaders and the jihadist movement in general always have taken a long view of the war, and discussion of a U.S. withdrawal from either Iraq or Afghanistan has long been anticipated. In planning the 9/11 attacks, al Qaeda leaders clearly expected that the United States, once drawn into a war, eventually would weaken and lose heart. A study of al Qaeda’s philosophy, mindset and planning — conveyed through the words and actions of its leadership — is a reminder of just how the current U.S. political debate fits into the jihadist timeline and strategy.

It also is an indicator that a U.S. withdrawal from Muslim lands is not al Qaeda’s ultimate requirement for ending attacks against the United States or American interests abroad.

Perceptions of American Resolve

Long before the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Osama bin Laden clearly stated that, in the jihadists’ opinion, the United States was not prepared to fight a war of attrition.

Prior to 9/11, bin Laden’s public statements conveyed his dim view of the U.S. military’s capabilities and resolve, as well as of the willingness of the U.S. government (and to a larger extent, the American people) to take casualties in a sustained war. In a 1997 interview with Peter Arnett, bin Laden said, “We learned from those who fought [in Somalia] that they were surprised to see the low spiritual morale of the American fighters in comparison with the experience they had with the Russian fighters. The Americans ran away from those fighters who fought and killed them, while the latter were still there. If the U.S. still thinks and brags that it still has this kind of power even after all these successive defeats in Vietnam, Beirut, Aden, and Somalia, then let them go back to those who are awaiting its return.”

It is widely believed that the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon, following the 1983 Marine barracks bombing, and from Somalia in 1993 were important precedents in driving the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. The jihadists believed that if they killed enough Americans, U.S. forces would leave Saudi Arabia.

Bin Laden’s opinion of U.S. resolve was not shaken by the “shock and awe” campaign that was unleashed in Afghanistan and, later, Iraq. In a February 2003 message, he said, “We can conclude that America is a superpower, with enormous military strength and vast economic power, but that all this is built on foundations of straw. So it is possible to target those foundations and focus on their weakest points which, even if you strike only one-tenth of them, then the whole edifice will totter and sway, and relinquish its unjust leadership of the world.”

Bin Laden and other jihadist strategists often have stressed that the U.S. economy is one of the foundations to be attacked. However, another significant — and in their view, vulnerable — target is morale. In an October 2002 statement, marking the first anniversary of the Afghanistan invasion, bin Laden discussed the importance of “the media people and writers who have remarkable impact and a big role in directing the battle, and breaking the enemy’s morale, and heightening the Ummah’s morale.”

He also noted that the Americans had failed to achieve their objectives in Afghanistan, saying, “The invading American forces in Afghanistan have now started to sink in the Afghani mud, with all of their equipment and personnel. The weird irony of the matter is that the Crusader forces, which came to protect the governing system in Kabul from the attacks of the mujahideen, have now come to need the protection of the regime’s forces, having been dealt continuous blows by the mujahideen, so who protects who? The international and American forces had come to ensure the security [but] have become the biggest burden to security!!”

Orders given by Mullah Omar and his tactical commanders to Taliban fighters in Afghanistan also reflect this mindset. They are told not to go toe-to-toe with coalition forces in battle, but rather to increase the costs of doing battle in order to hasten the withdrawal of Western forces.

An al Qaeda military strategist and propagandist, Abu Ubeid al-Qurashi, expounded on this concept in an article titled “Fourth-Generation Wars,” carried by the organization’s biweekly Internet magazine, Al Ansar, in February 2002:

“Fourth-generation warfare, the experts said, is a new type of war in which fighting will be mostly scattered. The battle will not be limited to destroying military targets and regular forces, but will include societies, and will seek to destroy popular support for the fighters within the enemy’s society. In these wars, the experts stated in their article, ‘television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions.’ They also noted that ‘the distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point.'”

Al-Qurashi went on to extol jihadist successes in fourth-generation warfare, in settings ranging from Afghanistan to Somalia. He also noted that, like the Soviet Union, the United States was not well-suited to fight that type of war. And he predicted that al Qaeda’s ideal structure for, and historical proficiency in, fourth-generation warfare ultimately would secure its victory — despite the fact that jihadists were outgunned by the Americans in both types and quantities of weapons. Al-Qurashi said that while the U.S. military was designed and equipped with the concept of deterrence in mind — that is, to deter attacks against the United States — the guiding principle was not applicable in the struggle against a nonstate actor like al Qaeda.

“While the principle of deterrence works well between countries, it does not work at all for an organization with no permanent bases and with no capital in Western banks that does not rely on aid from particular countries. As a result, it is completely independent in its decisions, and it seeks conflict from the outset. How can such people, who strive for death more than anything else, be deterred?” he wrote.

In contrast, al Qaeda’s leaders persistently have exhorted their followers to fight a war of attrition similar to that successfully waged by the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. In bin Laden’s words, “We don’t articulate and we don’t quit.”

One principle that has been emphasized in many statements by bin Laden and others is that the jihadists love death the way Americans love life — a concept originally stated by Abu Bakr, a companion of the Prophet Muhammad, as he led an army into battle against the Persians.

A Four-Part Strategy

The United States’ military response to the 9/11 attacks was the reaction al Qaeda wanted and expected. The statements of al Qaeda leaders have made it clear that the jihadists’ goal was to make sure these became protracted, painful and costly wars.

Ayman al-Zawahiri put it this way in August 2003, as the insurgency in Iraq was beginning to take hold: “We are saying to America one thing: What you saw with your eyes so far are only initial skirmishes; as for the real battle, it hasn’t even started yet.”

Now, whether al Qaeda or the jihadist movement actually retains the capability to achieve its long-term goals is a matter for vigorous debate, and one we have explored at other times. For purposes of this analysis, however, it is useful to examine just what those long-term goals, to which al-Zawahiri obviously was alluding, actually are.

Internal al Qaeda documents indicate that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan is but one of the stages factored into the movement’s long-term planning. One of the most telling documents was a July 2005 letter from al-Zawahiri to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq, outlining a four-step strategy for establishing a caliphate in the “heart of the Islamic world.” (The authenticity of the al-Zawahiri letter has been questioned by some, but our own analysis has led Stratfor to conclude it was bona fide.)

The steps he outlined were:
1) Expel the Americans from Iraq.
2) Establish an Islamic authority or emirate in Iraq.
3) Extend the jihad wave to secular countries neighboring Iraq.
4) Initiate a clash with Israel.

Al-Zawahiri said he was proposing the four-step strategy in order to “stress something extremely important” to al-Zarqawi, “and it is that the mujahideen must not have their mission end with the expulsion of the Americans from Iraq, and then lay down their weapons, and silence the fighting zeal.” He clearly wanted the jihadists to press on toward bigger objectives following the U.S. withdrawal.

In the letter, he cautioned: “Things may develop faster than we imagine. The aftermath of the collapse of American power in Vietnam — and how they ran and left their agents — is noteworthy. Because of that, we must be ready starting now, before events overtake us, and before we are surprised by the conspiracies of the Americans and the United Nations and their plans to fill the void behind them. We must take the initiative and impose a fait accompli upon our enemies, instead of the enemy imposing one on us, wherein our lot would be to merely resist their schemes.”

It follows from this that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be construed by the jihadists as an opportunity to establish an important base or sanctuary — and then to consolidate their gains and continue their “jihad wave” to other parts of the region. With that in mind, jihadist attacks against “Jews and Crusaders” could be expected to continue even after a U.S. departure from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The Ultimate Objective

Al Qaeda’s grievances with the United States have been well documented by Stratfor and numerous others since the 9/11 attacks: Bin Laden was outraged by the presence of U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia following the 1991 Gulf War, and by what he sees as an unholy alliance between Western powers and “apostate” secular regimes in the Islamic world. Historical conflicts between Muslim and Christian entities also have been referenced as a precedent for what bin Laden describes as “aggressive intervention against Muslims in the whole world” — meaning the U.N. embargo against Iraq, the existence of Israel and U.S. support for said “apostate” regimes.

In a February 1998 statement, bin Laden declared that “The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies — civilians and military — is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the Al Aqsa mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.

An important point is that al Qaeda defines terms like the “lands of Islam” as territory that includes present-day Israel, India and Spain. While Israel is clearly more significant to Muslims than other areas, given the importance of Jerusalem and the Al Aqsa mosque to Islam, Spain — which was the Caliphate of al-Andalus from 711 to 1492 — is also in the crosshairs. An equally important point is that the political shift in Madrid (which followed a 2004 commuter train attack in the capital) and the government’s decision to withdraw Spanish troops from Iraq have not removed Spain from the jihadists’ target list. In a July 2006 message — in which he threatened revenge for the Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinians — al-Zawahiri said, “The war with Israel … is a jihad for the sake of God … a jihad that seeks to liberate Palestine, the whole of Palestine, and to liberate every land which (once belonged to) Islam, from Andalus to Iraq.”

In other words, at least as long as the state of Israel exists — and the “apostate” governments in places like Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco and Kuwait remain in power, with U.S. support — the jihadists will continue to complain about U.S. “aggression against Islam.” And, insofar as they are able, they will carry on their war.

This report may be distributed or republished with attribution to Strategic Forecasting, Inc. at www.stratfor.com.

This analysis, using their own words, tells us there is the multi-generational war in the wings. The age of instant gratification/Desert Storm type “wins” aren’t going to be a reasonable expectation.

Is this a surprise to many? Maybe the link should be sent to Nancy Pelosi and Harry Reid.

Note the expectation of us ending this war in Iraq just as we did in Vietnam. My, my, my! So the Democrats in power are playing right into their plans, which would show the Democrats cannot understand their role on the larger stage of the World, then and now…

Posted in Little Green Footballs comment section….
H/T: Diary of a Mad Pidegon, Samantha Burns

Back when Jack Army was still in the Army recruiting business, I asked him what was allowed to give to Recruiters. I know back in my dark ages, there was a $4.95 retail value limit on “gifts,” which was revised to be something more intelligent just before I retired in 96. I thought the troops at the local station might enjoy a pizza or something like that, but I wanted to make sure so they weren’t in an uncomfortable position, If I sent a few large pizzas to their door. Not worth losing a career/position over. He gave me permission to provide some info extracted from his two emails.

“Jack” is a busy man and currently in the later part of his deployment to Iraq, but he made time to answer up. I got an answer I think we all might be able to give the overworked recruiters with:

As for your question, what is acceptable for a recruiter to accept? Certainly an occasional pizza will be heartily received and small tokens like that are fine. I don’t believe there is a regulation prohibiting recruiters from receiving gifts from private citizens, most would be too humble to receive much more than pizza and a soda or something similar.

I would tell you that the one thing that you could give a recruiter that would mean more than anything is a solid lead. A name and phone number of some young man or woman that would benefit from what the Army has to offer… you would have Army coffee cups, pens, desk calendars and just about any other lickies and chewies USAREC throws out there coming out of your ears!

I don’t need another coffee cup, but I think the recruiters could appreciate just what he asked for: Solid leads. Put your networking hats on, and get back into service, being an advocate for military service and the recruiters. We know they have problems in some areas getting into schools and universities, so complimenting their work would be a big boost for them. Keep your ears to the tracks and listening for that opportunity in a conversation to guide someone their way….and, just if you have the urge, maybe stop by with some coffee or donuts or pizza for them and tell them they are doing a great job.

Now, news from Iraq from “Jack:”

It has been a fast and furious time since about August 2005. As you probably know, I’m currently in Iraq. Things are going really well in our area of operations. Our Iraqi Army counterparts are progressing well and things in this zone are relatively quiet compared to zones on our borders. There are great things happening every day but there is still so much work to be done.

Somehow I don’t get the same picture from the MSM….so, from real boots on the ground, a senior NCO says it’s better.

While I tend to paint a rosy picture of things here (I am an optimist!), there are challenges. Corruption has been a problem. For example, Iraqi Army Soldiers and Iraqi Police officers used to demand bribes to get through some of the checkpoints in our area. The Iraqi Army commander here had signs put up at the checkpoints with his phone number on them stating that bribes where illegal and call the number to report IA or IP who demanded them. Also, obviously, he ordered the practice to be stopped as well. After he put the first violator in jail for a few days and took away a few days’ pay, that practice pretty much went away. Now, the only folks that will get hassled at a checkpoint is those that are suspicious or violate the law. Things are getting better.

Sounds like someone sees it’s time for a change, and it’s great to hear that the Iraqi officer is taking the lead in solving a problem.

Update 3/9/2007: In this “news” is the subtle message that changes, meaning it will take a while to change attitudes, as the poulation ages/dies off. At MilBlogs, Soldier’s Dad makes this point, but uses the Russian model and the memory of WWII as the example. The human experience, it’s new and it’s old, more times and ways that we like to imagine….

So, the recruiters are in the fight, too. Help them out if you get the chance.

Crossposted at: Third World County
Tracked back at: Woman, Honor Thyself, High Desert Wanderer, Big Dogs Weblog, Right Voices, Samantha Burns, Cao’s Blog

Open Trackbacks! Post your stuff!

Sea story of the week:

I first heard of, not by name, but by association, GSGS(SW) John “JC” Weigman, USN in the summer of 1983. I was a student at Surface Warfare Officer Department Head course, nearing completion of the 6 month school. By now, I was in the Engineering Specialty portion of the curriculum, having been detailed to be the Engineer Officer on USS CONOLLY (DD-979). There were ten of us in the class, taught by LCDR Alex Watt, sitting in two rows of chairs, 5 abreast, all destined to be in charge of SPRUANCE Class destroyer engineering plants. It was the last day of this part of the school, and Alex had gathered the current status of our ships, so we’d have an idea where they were in the training/inspection/deployment cycle. He began the class with some “good news” for one of us (I can’t recall what it was or who it was for) and “bad news” for one of us. He announced one of the ships rated several GS (Gas Turbine Specialist) Chief Petty Officers, but there was only one aboard.

Alex worked his way across the front row and then got to me in the center of the back row. He began the status of my upcoming assignment by saying “It’s you.” Great. Never wanted to be a “snipe,” had asked to be anything but a snipe, but I got to be a snipe, and then I was going to be shorthanded…..There’s about 2-3 more sea stories in that last comment, but later….

I arrive aboard the ship in Puerto Mont, Chile, having flown from Norfolk via Miami. GSMC(SW) Weigman is my leading enlisted man in the department. He began his career as an EN (Engineman) and had plenty of stories to tell, in particular, he was involved in the evaluation of the SeaFox SEAL patrol craft, which made for some good conversation late at night on watch. He converted to the GS rate when there was the massive build up of DDs and FFGs was at it’s peak in the early 80s, which was a great career move.

Supporting JC were GSM1 Graham, GSE1 Denny Rohr, GSE2 Walter Hook, GSM2 Belcher, GSM2 Shipley, GSM2 Roberge, GSM2 Dewberry and more I can’t recall right now, but…he was in fact the only Chief I had in the “M” (Main Probulsion) Division, led by LT Al Curry.

JC was more than a match for the task. He was a sailor and not a snipe first. His goal was always to make sure the Ship was cared for and running well. If that meant playing second fiddle in the priorities for some “upper deck” stuff, he was on board, and he was sending help as needed. He also instilled this in those in the entire Engineering Department. On the other hand, if there was a tie to be broken, he’d make sure, in the “Goat Locker” or in talks with the CO (CDR Harry Maxiner) that the snipes would get the best deal.

One of the ways he was so successful, and the point of this sea story is: When someone told him something couldn’t be done, or it had to be done some way that didn’t make sense, he’d go and seek out the guidance and self-educate. I know he took both the PN (Personnelman) and YN (Yeoman) rate correspondence courses (required for advancement in those rates), and I believe he also sat down and worked his way through the DK (Disbursing Clerk) material as well. The entire point was to know as much of their jobs as they knew. On many occasions, he found out the people had told him something wrong, or contradictory to the way things were to be done. He wanted to know what was right, and if you wouldn’t tell him, he’d go to the book, your book, then come back and quote it to you.

He did this with everything he worked with. He was an incredibly capable amn, and even though I was short two more Chiefs in the Main Propulsion area, he outdid any ten other chiefs I worked with, except three, who were cut from the same cloth, and I ran into them years later.

One particular area, where he used this process of doing things right was with the “Critical Gauge” program. Aboard the ship were hundreds of gauges and sensing devices that required periodic calibration. There were established “METCAL” teams of civil servants and contractors, who would come to the ship and go through and validate the accuracy (or repair/replace) every one of them. JC read the instruction and it said the critical gauge list was designated by the Commanding Officer, and the shore based support teams would check against the list of meter cards (one record for each gauge/sensor) listed by the Ship’s Company. JC wnet about making sure that every gauge was covered. He listed gauges in the ASROC heating and cooling system, in the electronic chilled water piping system, etc, etc, etc. Hydraulic meters and gauges in the 5’/54 guns were also included.

When we returned from the UNITAS deployment, the METCAL team paid us a call. The looked at this foot high stack of the meter card printouts and told JC (who was in charge of the program) that they only did engineering related gauges. He stared them down and told them the heating and cooling systems for the ordnance magazines were just as critical as the vibration transducers on the gas turbine engines and….futhermore, this was the Commanding Officer’s designated list, per the instruction and they were going to check them all. He was right on both counts. They left and started calling around. Net result, they did most of the work we handed them, but not all of it.

The net result of one man, shorthanded and all, was this: The METCAL team and their handlers successfully maneuvered to get the instruction changed, so the Squadron Commander would designate the “critical gauges.” That wasn’t the answer. The METCAL people needed to see he had a very valid point, and they needed to plus up their teams to cover more work aboard the ships during their visits.

So, the moral of the story is: If you do your homework, and learn what the other guy is supposed to be doing, you get a lot of work done, but sometimes, others will find an end around to keep from doing the work.

JC also took on the existing lube oil analysis program and if I recall correctly, he got them to change to a better method of detecting contaminants in the samples sent out to the labs, which helped in early detection of problems, and therefore ssaved taxpayer dollars.

By the time I departed CONOLLY, JC had made Senior Chief Petty Officer, and all of the other people I listed above added another paygrade to their sleeves/collars.

As far as not wanting the job? Well, it was one of the most rewarding tours I had. I credit a lot of sailors who didn’t want me to screw up for making me look good in that job. They are subjects of future sea stories, for they all have lessons and tales of their own.

I know it’s been quiet here, but I managed to get the 2.1.2 upgrade to WordPress in. I’m not so cavalier with my blog data as I sometimes am with other stuff I do, but I really step through is carefully, fearing a massive tear in the database time contiunium will lose valuable info. Well, that assumes this is valuable stuff….

I’ve been toying with a new widgetized theme on another parallel blog to tweak it into submission. I’m learning the CSS stuff bu hunt and peck/trial and error. Some moments I have success, some I do not. I enjoyed the ability of Regulus to swap header pictures easily from the presentation controls, and I’m trying to recreate that capability by grafting it into the new theme, a three column style. I’ve been head down in that for three evening after work and getting close….

In the meantime, for you Seadogs out there, check out Together We Served. So far, after being invited to sign up, I have already been in contact with 4 old shipmates, and a few people who I must have crossed pates with. Anyhow, possibly a better system to re-connect with the people you went to sea with, and maybe find some others you need to catch up with.

Work is picking up, as the days get lighter longer. Wednesdays will still be a standard feature for sea stories. I invite (currently) non-bloggers, who may have a story to share to send them along and I’ll be happy to post them for the historical value of it all.

Coming this week: “JC” Weigman on how to get things done….

Oh, and the current tech item of consideration: Neurok iZ3D LCD monitor.

1680×1050, 5ms response time, iand two DVI inputs, it uses two LCDs, sandwiched with two feeds off your video card, and then all you do is wear polarized glasses (no wires/batteries)….is $819 (if you order by 3/15/2007) a good deal? Flight simmers say any 3D system makes the flying, especially formation flying, far more lifelike and easy to do….

And onto the topic of Explosives Handling Personnel Qualification Certification Program (EHPQCP). There is a history to this program (like all others) and it has it’s good and it’s bad sides. Like the Personnel Qualification System (PQS), the EHPQCP arose from disaster, and formalized what has been done in the past by less bureaucratic means. PQS will be dealt with later in detail, separate from this series.

One of the bad parts of the EHPQCP was it “pig-piled” on other qualification processes, which increased the administrative loading on the Fleet operators, which takes time away from actual training efforts.

While the EHPQCP does not play a direct role in how this incident occurred, it was something we had been checking on surface ships for compliance during the Combat Systems Assessments, and during Cruise Missile Certification exams.

EHPQCP has it’s roots in the flight deck fire on the USS FORRESTAL (CV-59) off Vietnam on July 29th, 1967. Just about an hour before noon (local), as the air wing began it’s launch cycle. The story of the heroism and tragedy of that day are well chronicled in “Sailors To the End” by Gregory Freeman. That story is about East Coast sailors wanting to do well, and “modifying” the approved procedures, coupled with a starined logisitcal system that sent WWII bombs to fulfill the requisitions of the carriers, whihc cause more loss of life.Side historical note: LCDR John McCain was strapped in his A-4 Skyhawk, waiting to launch, when the initial missile was fired from an F-4 Phantom due to electromagnetic interference (EMI), starting John’s plane on fire. He crawled to safety off the nose and refueling probe of his flaming Skyhawk, dropping to the deck clear of the flames from the ruptured fuel tanks and ran to safety. It’s a great read, I highly recommend it.Net result of the fire: Another layer of training and qualification, titled “certification.” In addition to this efforts, the certification must be renewed annually. The basics of the program is that all persons who handle or “operate” ordnance must be certified for the discrete actions (loading, maintenance, firing, etc) on specific systems (Mk13 GMLS, Mk45/54 Gun, NATO Sea Sparrow, etc). Demonstration of knowledge of the tasks to be preformed is the intial step, and then the annual renewal to make sure the knowledge is retained/updated for newer procedures/system modifications.That, in and of of itself is not bad, but, with it’s proscribed forms, it was easy to “pencil whip” the paperwork for inspection and assist teams, which is the problem.

In the surface Navy, the program had been emphasized at the paperwork level, in detail by the Combat Systems Assessments. Surface Navy sailors would routinely question the need for such “extra” work, as there were systems such as PQS in place for the ordnance systems, complete with plenty of safety knowledge requirements, but they did it, albeit most times grudgingly.

Then, an incident in the surface Navy brought the EHPQCP right to the forefront: USS IOWA (BB-61) on 19 April 1989. The loss of 47 lives in that explosion resulted in a Court of Inquiry, in which a co-worker of mine had to sit at “the long end of the green table with no coffee cup and no ashtray” and answer some uncomfortable questions. He, a few months before, had been the inspector that gave a passing grade to the EHPQCP after scanning a small portion of the many thick notebooks of records aboard the ship. Needless to say, this brought a whole new level of attention to not only the forms, but the process in place aboard any vessel in the surface Navy. The inter-community friction over this program was that aviators caused the problem, but it was the surface ships who were chastised for not keeping up the extra paperwork, while the air Navy thumbed their nose at it. Even the Naval Air Forces, Atlantic Ordnance Handling Officer thought we were way too obsessive with the program (and that was in the early 90s, after IOWA’s accident)

As a result of the carriers I had to visit in the wake of the SARATOGA incident, I can say many ships did not use the program.

There’s a little history involved in several other parts of my Naval experience, that also was an area we would inspect.

The saga will continue….

Well, not a bumper sticker, but it could have been….

On a t-shirt:

I live in my own little world….but that’s OK because they know me here.

I know…a day late…I can make excuses, but not worth it.

I believe the other blog is gone, banished to digital nothingness by a hosting firm who wanted more money than this one did…

For this day, a blast from the past: “We don’t have enough fuel to reach Africa”, a true story of too much desire for liberty in Brazil, not enough advance planning and two ships (neither one of them a logistics type vessel) somewhere in the South Atlantic.

Enjoy! (and post your trackbacks!)