I found the .pdf files for one of my commands, courtesy of the taxpayers dollars!

Naval Ship Histories has the CNO mandated monthly history reports scanned in for some ships. I got the see some of the formal submissions I wrote!

There isn’t every ship, but your’s just might be one of them.

Also, as a bonus for reading this post, thanks to Eagle Speak, I found out the DoD publishes a “Bloggers Roundtable”, where there is material to address some of the issues and news in the blogs:

Welcome to the archives of the “Bloggers’ Roundtable.” Here you will find source material for recent stories in the blogosphere concerning the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Global War on Terrorism by bloggers and online journalists. Where available, this includes transcripts, biographies, related fact sheets and video.

Today, above the fold, main section, New York Times:

Photo: Tyler Hicks/New York Times
Caption: “Dutch soldiers, who stress reconstruction over combat, with a member of the Afghan National Police recently in Qala-e-Surkh, Afghanistan.”Could the parenthetical statement “who stress reconstruction over combat” have been left out and still conveyed a message? I think so, but I guess any set of words can be used to convey a bias when you really want to get the point across….

In the meantime, why are there no pictures like this of the SEABEES? They have been stressing not only reconstruction, but also construction over combat for their entire existence. Prominently displayed on their home page the words: “With compassion for others, we build – we fight for peace and freedom.” Not only do they build and fight, they have been known to build while they fight!

I guess the Dutch have issued camo and M-16s to carpenters.  I suggest they outsource their work to the Navy.

I went back and did some more work at the end of the posting on the topic of the captured British service members, based on the announcement from Iran today saying they were “pardoned.”

In the background, I’m doing an email discussion with someone who has questions on shipboard operations, and I suspect he has some detailed knowledge. I’m looking forward to reading some details, but it already sounds like letting your small boats operate in the open waters of the Gulf 4 NM away is a recipe for disaster, or this kind, and possibly a physical one from the elements in “normal” circumstances.

More when that comes through. I did spend a few months patrolling the “NPG” (Northern Persian Gulf) in an FFG, but spent more time in the “SOHEPA” (Strait of Homuz/Eastern Patrol Area) doing tanker escort on that cruise. All that while filling the Navigator billet, too.

Update: Here’s the post from Red State’s blog. He’s done some good homework and has some good graphics/charts and info to links on the ROE….

EU Referendum has more (found in the comments section at Red State).

It seems the USS CHINOOK (PC-9) and WHIRLWIND (PC-11) were in the flotilla. CYCLONE Class patrol boats that could have dashed in a put a hurting on any Iranians eyeing the Brits with evil intent….

Tracked back @; Yankee Sailor (who is back up and posting after a majority of a year layoff)

It’s “that” day again. Post your posts if you have them!

“Sea Story” of the day:

On Monday, I blogged that it had been 30 years to the day since I reported aboard my first command for work, rather than school. It, however, was a Saturday night, so it doesn’t count as much as today, which was a Monday 30 years ago, and my first work day in the Fleet.

The routine when arriving at any command is to be noted in the Ship’s Deck Log and the taken to the Executive Officer to commence your check in. And so it was, early that day on USS MILWAUKEE (AOR-2), still moored at Pier 2 in Norfolk. It was that time when I met CDR David Martin, a Surface Line Officer, and second in command. Tall and reasonably thin for a man in his middle age period of life, it was then when he looked in my service record and made a comment discussed here.

I had been dropped from the skies on short notice aboard MILWAUKEE. I had visions of being a Diving and Salvage Officer, but a small issue of claustrophobia manged to help redetermine my career path. Just a few weeks before this day, I had sat with the Traing Officer at the Naval Diving and Salvage School, Anacostia Navy Yard, and told him I thought I would just decline to continue for fear of hazarding not only myself, but any diving buddies int he water. I was dispatched, not to a sleek “Greyhound of the Sea,” but to what, in my limited knowledge, was a dead end job for a young man with a desire to command a ship with many weapons, with a hope of playing a strong second to the legend of Lord Nelson, John Paul Jones and many others who had gone down to the sea before me.

On the advice of a family friend, who was responsible for advising one very well known and powerful senator, I had taken the orders. This man, who had served under Chester Nimitz, provide what was very sage advice: “I can get your orders changed, but just remember, there will be a very large stamp, unseen, but well known across the outside of your service record, saying “Political Influence. Take the orders, and if in a year you feel it’s not to your liking, call me and we’ll see what we can do.” I never picked up the phone, as I found I was enjoying my job far too much….

But, there I was, a whirlwind of a morning, taken to Admin, shuttled to the Captain’s cabin, introduced to my Department Head, LCDR Frank Mueller, and all sorts of other things, but, the one detail I remember clearly was shortly after lunch, I was in my newly assigned stateroom and there was a knock at the door. I tentatively opened the door and there stood two second class petty officers. Before I could say anything, the one with black curly hair, Navy “BC” glasses and a full beard shoved a manila folder in my direction and said “You’re our new Division Officer, sign this!”

Taken aback for a moment, I said: “No, I haven’t relieved ENS Ralston yet.” “Sir, he’s on leave and we need this signed. You’re our new Division Officer.” So I took the pen and signed the casualty report.

And so went my first meeting with ETR2 Mike Krutsch and ETN2 Craig Johnson, for I was, as they so clearly stated, their Division Officer….

And that is what I distinctly recall of my first real work day in the service of the taxpayers.

It shouldn’t have hit me out of the blue as it did, but yesterday I realized I first “went to work” 30 years ago today.

It was a saturday that year, and, having arrived in Norfolk from the DC area, I knew I needed to report in. It’s not like I hadn’t stepped on a Quarterdeck before and handed over a very think manila envelope to and Officer of the Deck, but this time was different. It was my first permanent duty assignment. After several schools (4 to be exact, over a 10 month period), it was time to earn my pay.

It was early evening, and after dinner. It was dark and the USS MILWAUKEE (AOR-2) was berthed starboard side to to Pier 2 at the Norfolk Operating Base (NOB). LTJG George Parrish, the Ship’s Navigator, was the Command Duty Officer. Tall and thin, sporting a mustache, he sat down with the spouse and I in the sitting area of the Wardroom and told me what time to be at work on Monday morning. I can still recall the scene, but not the words spoken. anyhow, it was done, I had just begun an assigned three year division officer tour, which ended up lasting two years, before I was assigned to a pre-commissioning unit.

I was assigned as the Combat Information Center Officer, with additional duty as the Electronic Material Officer (CIC/EMO), leading the OI and OE divisions in the Operations Department under LCDR Frank Mueller, the Operations Officer.

The Commanding Officer was CAPT Wright, a submariner, with about one month of his command tour left. CDR David Martin was the Executive Officer. The Engineer Officer was LCDR Carl Klein, who was not a Surface Line Officer, but and Engineering Duty Officer who had convinced the Navy that large plants needed the expert attention of those who had chosen a profession of being engineers above commanding warships. The 1st Lieutenant was LCDR Leo “Mike” Pivonka. LTJG Pat Wall was the 2nd Division Officer and ENS Harry Watkins III was the 3rd Division Officer. LT Randy Rice was the Communications Officer, with LTJG Clifford Barnes aboard as the Damage Control Assistant. Bos’n Eddie Watson was in Deck Department, and in Engineering, there was one CWO4 as the Main Propulsion Assistant and a CWO3 as the Electrical Officer. The assigned Medical Officer was an OB/GYN by professional background, but our “Doc” nonetheless. He and the Supply Officer once had had a contest to see who could stay “in the rack” the longest and they were both golfers. I don’t recall who won, but I know it was the call of nature, and not the will to win that was the tiebreaker in the situation. I think they both put up a good fight….

Aboard the “Old Mil,” I began an education that taught you about seamanship, engineering and logistics, unencumbered by the flashiness of modern (or just about any) weaponry.

More to come on this topic this coming Wednesday in the Ropeyarn Sunday and Open Trackbacks series, for 4/4/1977 was my first actual working day in the Navy.

But we still need an ERA…

CDR Sara Joyner, Commanding Officer of VFA-105 Credit: US Navy Photo

We have females who have quite successfully attained roles of traditional male leadership, and in this case, in some of the “macho-est” hallways. But there is still the “GLASS CEILING!”â„¢ There are those women who just get it done, like the one flying with the Thunderbirds, and many others, yet there is a faction of women who desire to sit on the sidelines and carp about how they can’t get what they want. I knew men like this during my career. More often than not, the real reason they didn’t get the so desired promotion/duty/assignment was simple: They weren’t qualified.

Sometimes they we’re qualified because of things like physical limitations, other times education requirements they could not attain, and in too many other situations, they didn’t get off their cans and do the ground work to be eligible (meaning “it” had been within their reach, but they were the ones limiting their own upward mobility).

As a follow onto the successful VAW community music videos, I present this. You know, I’m beginning to wonder why there are so many YouTube type works on the Navy coming out of the aviation community. Is it they submariners and black shoes are too busy, or just not creative enough? You be the judge!

“Safety Chief”

Technical note: I guess I still have to figure out why YouTube videos don’t always play nice in WordPress, so just click and have fun!

Neptunus Lex and his commenters are on it. I added my two cents to the basic post titled Code of Conduct. Go over there and read the good words from a man who had the possibility, but never the “pleasure,” of being the guest of the military of a not so friendly to us nation to help frame some of the issues surrounding the incident of hostage taking by the Iranians that takes “above the fold” status in our media right now.

Here were my thoughts which I posted in his comments section:

Several issues come to mind with this incident:

While the “West” will realize that much of her statement most likely was coerced in one way or another, the “show” is not just to us. It was like Khadaffi launching 2 SA-5s in March ‘86 at our planes patrolling over the Gulf of Sidra: They were launched without benefit of the tracking radars being energized (which, by ROE, would have allowed the SEAD guys to ask no more questions before expending ordnance) so from a practical standpoint, they had no chance of striking a target (it being a semi-active homing weapon), unless a Naval Aviator decided to consciously fly into the ballistically projected path…No, it was about an Arab showing his great defiance of the Great Satan to his Arab brothers. They did have footage of the SA-5s rocketing off their launchers, so, he “saved face” and was a hero for a bit.

In that case, it certainly also gave leadership pause: Was it a hostile act if the weapon had an almost zero probability of hitting one of our units? Yes, we were scratching our heads for a while, but not long before the A-7s with HARM were granted permission to launch on any RADAR emissions (which they got to do). But, I digress…

The video of her speaking is to show the Arab world that Iran can take on the Western world, and despite the threats that got her to talk, which that culture most certainly knows all too well, that point will be dismissed and Iranian leadership has once more shown how weak the “West” is, as they can make us “talk” and we even have women to defend us. Big brownie points over there for the leadership.

Another thought come to mind about some letter or article in Proceedings I read many, many years ago, from a Naval Officer stationed in a mostly USAF joint command. He commented that everyone came to him to get naval questions answered and his admonition was to not think too much of your not so broad based naval experiences. He said he was (I believe, but old age my have caused the loss of detail) an aviator, so he said it was incumbent upon him to call old shipmates/classmates/other commands more clued in if he got questions about things like submarine capabilities. Good counsel, especially when you understand people make decisions based on what your respond with.

How does this play in? An Ordinary Seaman telling the world they most certainly had entered Iranian territorial waters? I don’t think she may have been privy to the exact positional data to make sure an assessment, particularly with the international relations implications. But, back to the first point: The rest of the world, except some of us, don’t realize that ordinary seaman, as good sailors as they may be, are not involved in the navigation operations of a vessel. All the world knows is it’s a “professional,” and therefore, the statement is valid….

I saw the scarf yesterday and it just made me think of dogs peeing on the fence post. Sorry about the base reference, but it’s about “marking” territory, which is really about stating who’s more powerful and she got to be the analogous fence post in this larger international affairs flap.

Anyhow, we live in interesting times…

The reference to the Gulf of Sidra operations in 1986 are provided in more detail in my serial posting A Journey into History, where I discuss the cruise that culminated in the bombing of Libya. I was there. The link is to Part I.

Update 3/31/2007: What did I tell you? It’s not about anything other than showing how great “they” are to their Islamic brothers (not mentioning sisters here, because those are just property to them).
Update 4/1/2007: Rich Lowry says the “move” has bigger implications than I imagined.

And a final new thought: Are the Brits being given Bibles and meals prepared especially for them, based on the diet they are used to in the UK, or are they being held without such luxuries? I’m sure no MSM reporter will consider finding out, for they may have to rethink their positions on GTMO.

Update 4/4/2007: Iran to release the Britons held in Iran. Nice move. And the President of Iran is “pardoning” them for their trespasses. Another poker chip on the table in the Middle East.

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad says 15 British naval personnel captured in the Gulf will be freed.
He repeated allegations that the British sailors and marines “invaded” Iranian waters, but said they would be freed as a “gift” to Britain.
[…]

Interesting turn of events. Leave your own territorial waters, enter those of another sovereign nation, take, by force military members of a third nation, lie about navigational data to the World, then “pardon” military members for a non-incursion into your sovereign nation’s territorial waters. Can someone explain why the rest of the world bows and scrapes and and thinks the Iranian Government is acting in some compassionate manner towards Her Majesty’s 15 sailors and marines?

In another time, the incursion of one nation’s military forces into the territory of another nation, with a specific, pre-planned operation to capture hostages (I’m not afraid of that word) from an allied, supporting nation’s military would have evoked a swift, and brutal military engagement. Yes, That’s right. One military attacked another. This isn’t diplomacy, it’s war, in accordance with the internationally recognized Laws of War. But that time seems to be past.

In another time, it was claimed that the use of force was the failure of diplomacy (I don’t agree with that view – military force is but one of the tools of diplomacy, used when it’s appropriate, not the diplomatic move of last resort), but as of recently reported news, it seems some would say the use of diplomacy is the failure of military force. That also is not true, but it will be preceived this way.

This buys Mahmoud Ahmadinejad points with his Islamic/Arab brothers (no sisters) for future propaganda to feed to the US/western world’s media outlets showing how he is a big enough man to solve a potential military face off by forgiving the trespassers (he might want to watch out, it’s beginning to sound pretty New Testament like to me). And, I predict, as the next election gets closer, we may even see the DNC use this as a model for how presidents should respond to aggression.

Remarkable! Cause the incident by design, let the tensions mount, then at the last moment, stand up and tell the world you’re the bigger man and forgetting it…

Score another win for the actors on the World’s stage. I’m not missing anything, am I?

Tracked back @: Thrid World County, stikNstein

Open trackback free fire zone…..

The “story” will appear a little bit later today…

Here “it” is:

It was a dark and stormy night (no, really!) and I had very recently been graced with the much toiled after “OOD(F)” (Officer of the Deck, Fleet Operations) letter, which was the “upgrade” from the prior check point in career development of the “OOD(I)” qualification. Now, I was placed in the watch rotation with the officers who were allowed to manage the moment to moment movements of the ship with other ships in formation. A big moment in a young surface warfare officer’s career. With the authority also came the responsibility of that duty as well.

We had been very busy unrepping (under way replenishing operations) most of the entire day light hours of that day out in the Atlantic, north of Puerto Rico somewhere. For a “fat ship,” that meant most of the crew was on deck, or at some attention mandating duty throughout the operations of passing “beans, bullets and black oil” to small (and big) boys alike. The Captain, at this time, Cecil Hawkins, spent most of his time in the port bridge wing chair and the XO, CDR David Martin, in the starboard bridge wing chair, watching the respective sides of the “main battery” of the ship, coordinating with the OOD for ship handling, the rig captains for hooking up, the other ship for stuff they needed, the supply officer to make sure the ships got the stuff they needed, etc, etc, etc. Even during a clear, sunny day, it’s a tough day, particularly mentally.

In the watch rotation, it was my turn to take OOD for normal steaming after we secured from UNREP stations, and late. The sky was almost black, for the cloud cover was solid and about 1000-1500 ft high. If the moon was full that night, it still mattered not, as we were stuck beneath the canopy of dense moisture. The CO and XO had departed the Bridge area and headed below to get some sleep, as time marched towards midnight.

We had been off to the side, with the designation as the formation guide (meaning everyone formed up on us, we just stayed on the ordered course and speed), so we had little maneuvering to worry about. Then the tactical radio crackled to life, giving us a coded message to take a station within the main formation of the aircraft carrier and the surrounding escorts. Guidance from the “standing orders:” Call and notify the Captain. Once I was certain the order was received and understood by my watch team, I picked up the sound powered phone and called the CO. He had had time to get to sleep, so this call (obviously) woke him up. He acknowledged my notification of our change in status in the formation.

We dutifully computed our course to get to the ordered station, and had plotted the formation stations of the other vessels. We would have to weave between a few ships to get inside the protective screen. Not bad, even at night, when equipped with such modern conveniences as RADAR, and the visibility, at surface level being pretty unrestricted. Get the bearing by visual observation, then check the range via RADAR and begin to move.

We were several miles out, so the move to station would take some time. Part way to the formation, the PRITAC (Primary Tactical, later TFTG TAC) spewed forth another message to the entire force in company: “Extinguish Navigation Lights.” OK…it was still a dark, but, the stormy part you could argue, and we had to now navigate by RADAR alone. Challenging, but not hair raising. Once more, call to inform the CO….Once more, in a sleepy voice, he responded that he understood we were now running in complete “darken ship” mode.

We steam on, a tired crew below, and the rest of us on watch. Again, the radio spoke: “EMCON ALPHA.” Emission control condition “A.” All electronics in the “off” position….on a dark, and maybe stormy night….still steaming in a 40,000 ton replenishment oiler towards an aircraft carrier, and her small boys in concentric rings about the capital ship.

Call the CO….

We got into station, no paint was scraped, no lives were lost, maybe some hair went gray (or grayer for the older watchstanders) and I was eventually relieved by the on coming ODD several hours later.

The next work day, one of the lieutenants came to me and gently whispered to me, while standing close to me and out of earshot of anyone else and said: “If the CO didn’t trust you to make good decisions, he wouldn’t have signed you OOD(F) letter.”

At one level good guidance, based on the long day the entire crew had had, but certainly OODs never really had free reign to do what they wished with the ship, even on some dark and stormy nights at sea.

Last post discussed the Explosives Handling Personal Qualification/Certification Program (EHPQCP) and how it came to be, as a component of the investigation of the incident aboard the USS SARATOGA (CV-60) in the Med.

Today, some beginning information on the Personnel Qualification System (PQS) and, as I continue, how it played into this incident.

One of my assigned team members, LCDR Don Diehl, wasn’t a big proponent of PQS. While he wore the “water wings” of a Surface Warfare Officer, he has spent much of his career aboard aircraft carriers, being assigned to the USS EISENHOWER (CV-69) in the Operations Department at the time of this assignment. At first, we locked horns many evenings, as we traveled the East Coast and all the way to the Red Sea over the need for this program. He eventually saw my point, as we cut through the standard standard objections fleet sailors like to put forward.

I intend to take the issue of how PQS works up in detail one day soon, as I ended up getting elbow deep in the program in the last half of my career, but the basics of PQS is to validate that training has been held and the knowledge from training retained by the person who will be “qualified” to stand watches of preform various duties aboard ships. In the aviation world, the analogous program is NATOPS. On submarines, they use some PQS, but then have another program in place to validate crew members can perform their duties.

Aboard the USS SARATOGA, the key players in the scenario were:

• Tactical Action Officer (TAO) (Navy Aviator LT (O-3)), Not qualified by PQS
• Ship’s Weapons Coordinator (SWC) (Navy Aviator LT (O-3)), Not qualified by PQS
• Target Acquisition System (TAS) Operator (FC2 (E-5)), Qualified by PQS
• Firing Officer Console (FOC) Operator (FC3 (E-4)), Not qualified by PQS

The TAO did have a letter of designation from the Commanding Officer, an essential piece of paper to allow someone other than the Commanding Officer of a vessel to employ the Ship’s weapons. This position came about during the Vietnam era, when the age of anti-ship cruise missiles rose into a real possibility, reducing reaction times dramatically from the days of gun fights at sea, where you generally had some notice before the first was joined. It is an job of great significance, as it requires a great degree of discretion and sound judgment under conditions requiring split second decision making skills with accuracy.

The path to qualification for the TAO required attending a shore based course (it was six weeks long during my career), where you are first given the “threat matrix,” massive lists of the weapon systems that we were likely to face and their technical capabilities. These were to be memorized, as the information must be readily available when sensors alert you to the inbound weapon, or presence of a threat platform.

Upon return from the school, and usually after some period of “under instruction (UI)” watchstanding, the Commanding Officer would convene a qualification board of the crew experts and you would be grilled on the ship’s specific processes, procedures, current operations orders, rule of engagement (ROE) and your knowledge of the friendly and enemy threat capabilities. If you passed muster, then you were given a letter of qualification, to be filed in your record and annotated on your fitness reports, and allowed to bear the responsibility of the authority to say “SHOOT!” and have people do what you say in a life and death situation.

Were is PQS in this? There was one, the 43304 series. Back then, it was either the B or C edition, but it is now up to the D edition. If it existed, then its use was required. Who says? Well, the Chief of Naval Operations, for one. From OPNAVINST 3500.34F, para. 4.F.:

4.F. PQS use is mandatory, except when suspended or canceled by the lead respective Type Commander (TYCOM). […]

It had that same paragraph for my time in service, therefore, unless Commander, Naval Air Forces Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT) had issued a directive to not use the PQS for TAO, it also had to be a part of the path to qualification for the TAO’s aboard SARATOGA. I say SARATOGA, but off all the PQS’ in use, I regularly had arguments with Commanding Officers on surface ships, saying the TAO qualification was up to them, and they didn’t think they needed to use PQS to qualify TAOs. I always figured 4 stars beat any oak leaf or eagle, but that might have just been a pet peeve with me….

There is/was PQS for the Mk-23 TAS Opertator, 43406 series, and also for the MK91 Fire Control/NATO Sea Sparrow Missile System Operators (43328 series). I didn’t regularly work aboard aircraft carriers, and I can’t find a listing for PQS for the Ship’s Weapons Coordinator for a CV Combat Direction Center (CDC), but I suspect it existed.

More later on the PQS issues and the incident….