It’s been pretty slim in terms of comments lately. I did fix the problem I injected into the system, so….feel free to fact check me or add to any discussion. Post trackbacks here, also.

Sea stories. A serial story, today the first part….

Back in “the day,” one of the drills we had to complete on a periodic basis (I believe this one was quarterly), was the Intrusion Drill, know widely by the exercise nomenclature of “Z-5-O” from the list of exercises. This was spoken as “Zulu Five Oscar.”

The general manner of running this drill was your parent squadron would notify one of the other ships in the squadron that they were being tasked to run the drill on you and they gave them a several day time span to do this and then file the grade sheets with the squadron. What were they to do? Send people to your quarterdeck with false/no identification and attempt to be allowed access to the ship without and escort and being properly recorded in the security log at the Quarterdeck. The idea was to see if the august trio of inport watch standers (the Officer of the Deck (OOD), Petty Officer of the Watch (POOW) and Messenger of the Watch (MOOW), would properly assess the person asking to come aboard was not to be allowed unhindered access to the vessel.

The normal inport quarterdeck of any ship in that era was manned by these three men and, during the work day, were generally very busy with handling the ebb and flow of those coming and going, passing ship’s standard routine, routing incoming phone calls (back in the 70’s most ship’s had two, maybe three phone lines, the one to the quarterdeck was the published number and received calls from businesses, other commands, distraught girlfriends wanting to know if their boy friend had arrived yet, the supply center, and the command duty officer from the senior ship at the pier (Pier SOPA) to inform the OOD of a pallet on the pier, or that the man hoisting the Jack (the little flag flown on the jackstaff on the bow (the “flag” in the Navy is called the “Ensign” and it is hoisted on the staff at the stern) didn’t have his hat on properly at morning colors, or some such complaint about a breach of good order and discipline or general military appearance. And then add the internal issues to the ship to the workload of concerns. I’m not making excuses, I’m just relating the mayhem that is the norm at this watch station on a moment to moment basis.

Being in the “Fat Ship” Navy, we didn’t always seem so serious about things that seemed like purely warfighting issues. After all, we only had four converted from aircraft 20mm cannons as our main battery while at sea, mounted on tripods at the four upper level corners of the after superstructure, all manually aimed (think of the movies of the deck gunners in WWII firing at incoming kamikazes…that was us in the cruise missile and jet age), and inport, two armed men, one the POOW, the other a roving security watch were the combined defense force for 8M gallons of fuels and 600 tons of ordnance. They were equipped with the mighty 1911 .45 caliber pistol and two magazines of ammunition (14 rounds).

However, we were serious about our mission to keep the glamorous aviators and the greyhounds of the sea on task by supplying them with fuel, spare parts and chow.

The drills, and I had only been aboard a few months at this point, and it was my first ship, so I was still but an Ensign, without much understanding of the way things were at this point, were generally done by gentleman’s agreement, unspoken as it was within the fat ship fraternity, to not let your “shipmates” fail, unless they were literally sleepwalking at their duty, in which case, then it was fair to write them up as failing. Minimal effort to catch the “intruders” was sufficient to get a passing score submitted…Most drills ended with “OK, yes, I am. Here, sign the paper” and life went back to “normal” at the Quarterdeck.

And then one day, you know it just had to happen, someone decided to shake things up a bit….

I didn’t have the watch, and it wasn’t even my duty day, yet I did comprehend that when a sailor from the USS SEATTLE (AOE-3) made it past our quarterdeck and was allowed to wander freely, without a visitors badge, it was bad for us.

I don’t recall the specifics, but somehow my division Chief Petty Officer, OSC Michael P. McCaffery, was tasked to do the honors of “counterbattery fire.” For all I know, he may have, and it would have been in character, volunteered to formulate and execute the operation to show our appreciation with the breaking of the status quo at the piers.

The “game rules” for conducting a Z-5-O were roughly thus:

• Three attempts were to be made within the time frame in the tasking letter;
• Real military identification cards could not be used;
• If asked “Are you and intruder?”, the “intruder” had to respond truthfully;
• Copies of military IDs could be used (meaning from the Xerox machine).

A long discussion could launch from this point about how agents of the KGB would never dare to use real stolen ID blanks to try to get access to a ship, that they, too, only had the technology of SAVIN or Xerox to make up false papers for doing their dirty work. On top of that, it was a well known fact that all foreign agents would tell you right away, when specifically questioned, that they were up to the business of stealing military secrets (If only Jack Bauer had known this, it would have saved several presidents lots of international embarrassment).

So…one day, the Operations Officer, LCDR Frank Mueller, presented a letter from the squadron to me. Subject? Yes, you guessed it: Tasking to conduct a Z-5-O on the USS SEATTLE (AOE-3).

You’ll have to come back next Wednesday for more (and not the rest) of the story…

Last post on the topic…

The roots of the Combat System Training Teams (CSTT) grew from the Engineering Casualty Control and Damage Control Training Teams (ECCTT/DCTT), where were put in place in the mid-late 70s in response to the poor maintenance condition of the ships in the later part and post- Vietnam War era. There, the standing up of the Propulsion Examination Boards (PEBs) in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets, required a ship have an organic training capability. As best I can figure, this came from a philosphy that while an individual crew/watch team might perform well today, was there a reasonable expectation it would do so tomorrow, a month or a year from now. I can further speculate, but I never read anything that would connect this next set of dots, that the PEB and the inspections they performed, the Light Off Exam (LOE) and the Operational Propulsion Plant Exam (OPPE) had been “lifted” from the Nuclear Navy’s rigorous system of ensuring the safety of those operations.

The processes of the CSTT modeled the ECCTT/DCTT ones, which, as I discussed some time back, was a result of professional plagiarism, in a good way. One of the significant parts of the training scenarios is to plan for possible safety problems and then make sure the training team members are knowledgeable about the systems and able to step in and stop the drill if such a problem arises. Sometimes, separate safety observers were stationed to specifically watch for problems, while the main training team members are running the drills, or observing the crew’s operations.

During the pre-brief for the drills, the CSTT procedures required detailed discussions of the simulations and variations for real operations, and the safety concerns. Before the drills ran, the CSTT was to walk through the spaces and check to general safety status of the area, as well as to check particular equipment settings. The final reports to the CSTT team leader required “all safety checks completed” before the training scenario would commence.

This set of procedures may have rendered this thread of posting completely moot, had there been a CSTT established, qualified and trained aboard SARATOGA that night….

to be continued…

Here is it. They have the audio done there, too! Ron Allen is the winner.

Oh, it was a contest held by Bill Bennett on his morning talk show to come up with a song about Sandy Berger taking files from the National Archives.

Lyrics from the post:

Sandy Berger Can
by Ron Allen
(to the tune of “Secret Agent Man”)

Bill and Hillary lookin’ for a legacy
But the national archives held a vast conspiracy
They thought about a plan
Asking who would be their man
Who can we now trust to crack this quandary?

Sandy Berger can
Sandy Berger can
He can stuff that troubling history into his socks and pants

Now Bill and Hillary met with Sandy Berger.
They talked about the plan…now it’s not murder.
They gave him all he’d need.
They thought he could succeed.
It simple, just go in and get those files.

Sandy Berger can
Sandy Berger can
He’ll stuff those troubling files into his socks and pants.

The day had come and it was time to do it.
If he is caught the press can misconstrue it.
It’s not that big a deal, it had a presidential seal.
And he said he’s sorry so that ends it.

Sandy Berger can
Sandy Berger can
He’ll get us eight more years
So we can implement our plan

Your next opportunity to become famous may be when Bill Bennett has an essay contest, subject: “A World Without America.” IT might be set up to be completed around July 4th this year….some details here.

Open trackbacks! Now, if I could just get comments working…if you have one, email it until I can get the background issues cleared up. I’m sure I can kludge it in when I get it….

So, post your work here!

Sea stories?? Yes…it will be here in a few hours…busy day here…it also will be in the “Australian” theme of the previous two weeks….UPDATE: Here is the promised story

I had a Royal Australian Naval Officer, LCDR Kim Bailey-Jones, as my project officer for the PERRY Class FFG Combat Direction Systems computer program. This was a standing exchange billet, as the RAN had 4 FFGs in their fleet and cost shared in the maintenance and upgrades for the program.

Money was getting tight in the 1994-95 time frame for the military in general, and we regularly received calls from the main program sponsor, Program executive Officer – Theater Air Defense (PEO-TAD) to recall funds from the authorized “SEATASK.” On most occasions, I was asked to respond with how to we might absorb a $1.1M cut (for an overall funding line of $11M) for the various PEO-TAD projects covered. LCDR Jones sat down and sharpened his pencil and typing effort in a spreadsheet, so as to make his point in the upcoming Quarterly Progress Review to our TAD sponsors.

As we were gathered in the large command auditorium, and it was LCDR Jone’s turn to review his project’s status. He got to his budgeting slide and said: “If you can’t give me this much, then just cancel the program and save the money (which was several million).” Of course, he has pre-briefed the “bombshell” up the chain of command and had approval to say such a thing.

Bottom line, the expertise required to safely and responsibly maintain the program needed 4 discrete fields of expertise, and his bottom line funding line represented the barest of funds to keep those four people on staff for such work. Well, the PEO Rep, an Engineering Duty Captain certainly was taken back, but, when Kim made his case, his logic was infallible and there really wasn’t much to be said, but just to note the amount of funding that must remain in place if the FFG-7 Class was to stay at sea.

Oh, I had a Canadian Armed Force officer on staff, too….

The ramp up to the mission of making sure our ships could safely employ a major weapons system, in this case NATO Sea Sparrow System (NSSMS), was not as difficult as it would seem, but it certainly required a multi-faceted approach. For almost three years, I had been assigned to inspect the combat systems readiness of the Atlantic Fleet’s surface force. That meant, for those not familiar with the “ownership” of ships in the Navy, all ships, except aircraft carriers (those belong to the commanders of the naval air forces in the Atlantic and Pacific areas – COMNAVAIRLANT, in my case), and the ships directly related to supporting submarines, those being the submarine tenders (AS) and submarine rescue ships (ASR). Any other ship belonged to Commander, Naval Surface Forces, Atlantic (COMNAVSURFLANT). If “it” had a weapons system more complex than a M2 .50 caliber machine gun on a tripod mount, then the ship required an annual Combat Systems Assessment (CSA) (which began in the late 1980s, but were canceled sometime in 1994 or 1995 – but that’s another piece of history for another time).

The foundation of the NATO Sea Sparrow readiness inspections in the aftermath of this incident came from the existing CSA check sheets, which had been in development for several years at this point. Prior to April, 1990, the Atlantic Fleet CSA procedures had been put together by training teams, which not only were tasked to do the fleet training, but also the CSAs. In April that year, a new department within the NAVSURFLANT Combat Systems Mobile Training Team (CSMTT) was established and manned. A complete review of every existing check sheet began, ensuring the listed standards were from an official document, and not from “It’s a great idea, because I did in on USS LAST SHIP” files. In addition to the scrub, the located reference, to the page or paragraph, was inserted as part of the inspectable point.

Those check sheets, for the administrative areas of training, Combat Systems Training Team (CSTT), Personnel Qualification System (PQS), Explosives Handling Qualification/Certification Program (EHPQCP), Battle Orders, watch bills, and safety (those I know for sure, but probably a few more, too), as well as grading criteria for setting up, executing and debriefing a battle scenario using the NSSMS were all tossed into the package for review by the Pacific Fleet counterparts and Commander in Chief, Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFLT) staff. The advantage was the check sheets had been in use for a few years at this point, and had always been made available to the Fleet. The CSTT drill procedures had been around for some time, but had not been widely enforced, as the Engineering Department versions in the form of the Engineering Casualty Control and Damage Control Training Teams (ECCTT/DCTT) had been since the post-Vietnam era via the Operational Propulsion Plant Exam (OPPE) requirements. In mid 1991, the CSA process was revised, and a major “go/no go” pass/fail criteria was the established CSTT by command letter, which elevated the emphasis on the use of internal “experts” to be able to keep the crew up-to-date on procedures, as well as providing an on the job training path to induct new crewmen into the teams in place.

Why is the discussion of the CSTT important in this history? Once the CSMTT and the Fleet Training Groups took up the issue of ensuring a CSTT on surface force ships was established, had scenarios, were qualified and had a training plan process, the trainees could receive more realistic training, as the safety aspects of the running the scenarios was paramount in the set up, debriefing and execution of the drills. The COMNAVSURFLANT instructions and Training and Readiness manuals (TREADMAN) on the CSTT were revised to reflect current operations and then it was trained to. COMNAVAIRLANT did not have any requirements on the books to have the CVs stand up and maintain a CSTT. This key process in conducting training became a factor, very directly, in the events of the night of October 2nd, 1992.

to be continued….

Last October, I put up the “teaser post.” About this time in 1993, Capt Phil Balisle (now Admiral) came into my office and informed me I would be detailed to lead a team for Commander, Atlantic Fleet, to validate all Atlantic Fleet units properly under stood the safe employment of the NATO Sea Sparrow systems aboard their ships. The Pacific Fleet would have a team visiting their vessels, and we would work from a common set of checksheets during the course of the follow up to the investigation of the incident. I was given, from Commander Naval Air Forces, Atlantic, LCDR Don Diehl, from the Guided Missile School at Dam Neck, FTCS Goss, and from my own command, FTC Dann, and told to get to work.

The requirement levied upon us was to go to each ship, except those in such operational status that they could not show us the system, as was the case for the USS O’BANNON (DD-989), and ensure the men standing the watches were school/PQS/OJT on paper qualified, and, by practical demonstration, knowledgeable in actual operations of a simulated engagement in a training scenario.

Having already having spent some energy over the prior two years standardizing Combat Systems Assessments (CSAs) with the West Coast CSA Team, some ground work was already done, so the agreement on the plan for the standard inspection clicked quickly.

I read the report from, I believe Admiral Cebrowski, and the executive summary had some chilling words (I believe I recall them accurately):

Unfortunately, the system (NATO Sea Sparrow) worked exactly as designed.

That set the tone for where the deficiency was that turned that night into one so many would like to have gotten a “do over” card for: The people screwed up. All too often, that is the case in the course of operations. Equipment: “CHECK!” People: “Hold on, we have a problem.”

In the first few days of my assignment to this tasking, I attended a meeting set up by Commander, Air Forces, Atlantic (AIRLANT), where a large group of aviators were to determine just how many switch operations, cover lifts, or button pushes were required to get each of the weapons off any aircraft in the inventory. I think one pilot briefed than in an A-6E, it took 82 separate things to launch a Harpoon Anti-Ship Missile. So, there was sat, all morning, and after lunch, started up again. Finally, one aviator sitting at the table in front of me (I was the “shoe” in the room, so I took a cheap seat along the wall), out of frustration, made this salient comment:

If that man thinks he has permission to shoot, it doesn’t matter how many things he has to do, he’s going to launch that weapon.

The heads, mostly fighting to stay awake after hours of laboriously presented technical details, nodded in agreement. The meeting, didn’t last too much longer, for the primary point had been made by that statement. Unfortunately, as I came to understand more of the details of that night, this aviator was more correct than I would know at the time…..

More later…

From the wonderfully insightful work of Cox and Forkum site:

CAIR is raising a ruckus about the depiction of terrorists. It follows the pattern. Pick away at any situation here in the US that makes them “feel” bad, yet never stand up and condemn the beheading/torture/slaughter of anyone in the Middle East, or Thailand or the Philippines, or Malaysia (you get the idea.

The plan? Well, make us afraid to even comment that Muslims may be connected with terror, which makes it easier to walk on buy with evil intent, and we are afraid, for fear of lawyers championing the “cause.”

On top of that, what word can we use to epand the description beyond “hyper-?” As with credit cards types, first they were just cards, then “Gold” cards, then “Platinum” and now “Titanium.” Before long, you just run out of elements in the periodic table and then what do you do? We’re kinda already at the end of the modifier run for descriptions of over the top reactions….suggestions?

Last week, a “nickel back” story, and this week, more stories about “Aussies.”

In the meantime, feel free to track back (except for spammers…)

So, there I was with a ship load of Aussies in training. They were, more so than most ship’s crews for our FFGs, really far from home.

So, if you head down to the club with the Aussies, they have a particular cultural behavior to promote equanimity between those in attendance. It’s considered polite for buy drinks in “rounds.” After all, you are at the club, to tell “sea stories” but….well, to drink.

In Aussie-speak, they call a round of drinks for your group a “shout.” So, the “shouts” begin. Not a big deal, but there is another rule: Everyone buys a shout. Ok, makes sense. Now the third rule: You stay to have a shout from everyone. To even put your cash on the bar and make sure there’s enough for your social obligation, then say your goodbyes is *not* acceptable.

Lessons learned the hard way (called in hard gained wisdom): Never go drinking with more Aussies than the number of drinks you want (can) drink in that setting….

Previously regarding the Fairness Doctrine.

I have been searching for the source document that is the “Fairness Doctrine” from the FCC, but it seems to be more a series of positions and some court cases, with some input from Federal Law that puts the boundaries around this concept, rather than a single pamphlet that one can pick up and read and say “Ah Ha! I get it!” So, please bear with me, as I try ti tie several things together that will help make the concept more useful for the discussion.

From Fairness and Accuracy In Reporting site, there is a lengthy discussion, which covers many parts that feed into the formulation of the Fairness Doctrine. I’d advise you to head to the link and read it to help get your arms around it.

One of the more recent situations that have brought this issue to the forefront of the discussion was the controversy of airing the documentary “Stolen Honor” preceding the 2004 Presidential election.

From what I gather, the Fairness Doctrine is supposed to be there to prevent a single message being aired and controlled by a particular group. When one media outlet, Sinclair Communications, wanted 62 stations to air the documentary, there was a reluctance on the part of some of their stations and, based on the ensuing discussions, the demand to air the program was rescinded. Keep this in mind, when in the prior post on this topic, I noted the plan by Ms. Hennock was to have 500 TV stations in the country back in the late 40s. Consider than 62 stations does not even represent a majority of the total number of 500, let alone the massive numbers of TV stations available in 2004.

From the FAIR site:

The necessity for the Fairness Doctrine, according to proponents, arises from the fact that there are many fewer broadcast licenses than people who would like to have them. Unlike publishing, where the tools of the trade are in more or less endless supply, broadcasting licenses are limited by the finite number of available frequencies. Thus, as trustees of a scarce public resource [ed: my italics], licensees accept certain public interest obligations in exchange for the exclusive use of limited public airwaves. One such obligation was the Fairness Doctrine, which was meant to ensure that a variety of views, beyond those of the licensees and those they favored, were heard on the airwaves. (Since cable’s infrastructure is privately owned and cable channels can, in theory, be endlessly multiplied, the FCC does not put public interest requirements on that medium.)

Proponents today, appear to be coming from the same angle. It’s about radio and over the air TV frequencies are public resources, and therefore subject to regulation. Hang onto this point.

The Fairness Doctrine had two basic elements: It required broadcasters to devote some of their airtime to discussing controversial matters of public interest, and to air contrasting views regarding those matters. Stations were given wide latitude as to how to provide contrasting views: It could be done through news segments, public affairs shows or editorials.

Key phrases: “Some of their airtime” “Controversial matters” “Wide latitude.”

American thought and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who operate these stations, for publicity is the most powerful weapon that can be wielded in a republic. And when such a weapon is placed in the hands of one person, or a single selfish group is permitted to either tacitly or otherwise acquire ownership or dominate these broadcasting stations throughout the country, then woe be to those who dare to differ with them. It will be impossible to compete with them in reaching the ears of the American people.

— Rep. Luther Johnson (D.-Texas), in the debate that preceded the Radio Act of 1927 (KPFA, 1/16/03)

So, in 1927, the known technology for mass communication was the radio. TV wasn’t available for 30 some years later. Mr. Johnson had it right, for his time, for the technology, for the way society operated.

In 1959 Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to enshrine the Fairness Doctrine into law, rewriting Chapter 315(a) to read: “A broadcast licensee shall afford reasonable opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on matters of public importance.”

That looks like there is a foundation for the Doctrine, but, leaves lots of maneuvering room, which certainly is in the vein of the 1st Amendment, to allow freedom.

There are many misconceptions about the Fairness Doctrine. For instance, it did not require that each program be internally balanced, nor did it mandate equal time for opposing points of view. And it didn’t require that the balance of a station’s program lineup be anything like 50/50.

So, according to the writer, we are not strapped into “equal time.” That’s good for the stations, and also allows for others to be heard.

Read the FAIR posting in detail, if you desire to become educated more on the topic.

That’s the history I can dig up. It lends itself to much discussion, yet, I can’t pin down who this applies to, other than radio and over the air television broadcasters. If that’s the case, then it’s not so bad to have this discussion with the Democrats. If, along the way in the discussion, there is a move to apply “fairness” in some form as interpreted by the existing law and regulations on such things as cable TV and the internet, it could get interesting.

Besides not finding a definitive “covered group/entities,” it seems to be a squishy issue to figure out what topics, or categories, that fall under this requirement to make allowances for opposing views. “Controversial matters,” depending on who is allowed to say what is controversy or not will define how intrusive this Doctrine, if made into Federal Law. This is a significant part of the discussion worth monitoring closely, if this move to “re-instate the Fairness Doctrine” moves forward.

More later….but remember: Forewarned is forearmed.

Tracked back at:
Third World County

January 20th, 1981… some Americans were freed, just in case you forgot about the day 444 days of captivity disgraced our nation, when the President refused to respond to the attack on the soil of America.

Now he’s acting like he’s some kind of hero from first facilitating the ascendancy to power, then backing down from them right away.

A Navy Aviator, then a Commander in rank, was sent to Iran, as the storm was brewing…to “advise” our allies in the Iranian Air Force, to whom we had sold the F-14 Tomcat to. It seems his job was to inspect each of their aircraft and make sure the capability to employ the AIM-54 Phoenix as disabled. He did that, and then was the guest of Amadinerjacket and company for over a year.

I knew this man when he was the Chief of Staff for Commander, Cruiser-Destroyer Group TWO (CCDG2) in 1988-89, by then the rank of Captain.

Thank you, Capt Sharer for your service so many years ago.